Antitrust- Congress Enacts Antitrust Civil Process Act by Editors,
1963]
RECENT LEGISLATION
ANTITRUST-CoNGREss ENACTS A-TITRUST CIVIL PROCESS ACT
The recently enacted Antitrust Civil Process Act 1 authorizes the
Attorney General to serve a "civil investigative demand" upon "any cor-
poration, association, partnership, or other legal entity not a natural per-
son" 2 whenever he "has reason to believe" that such entities "may be in
possession, custody, or control of any [non-privileged] documentary ma-
terial relevant to a civil antitrust investigation." a This demand requires
the material to be produced for inspection and reproduction by the
Department of Justice.4 It must describe the classes of material to be
produced "with such definiteness and certainty" that the material can be
"fairly identified." r It must also "state the nature of the conduct con-
stituting the alleged antitrust violation" and specify the applicable statutory
provision.6 The documents so obtained may be used in both criminal and
civil progecutions. 7 A party served with a demand may obtain judicial
review either by failing to comply and then defending against the Attorney
General's petition for a court of enforcement order,8 or by petitioning a
district court to modify or set aside the demand.9 Any final order of a
district court ma be challenged in the court of appeals.Y0
I. PURosE OF THE AcT
In creating the Antitrust Civil Process Act, Congress was primarily
concerned with equipping the Department of Justice with a proper and
effective means of obtaining evidence of past antitrust violations." The
two authorized methods of investigation previously available to the Depart-
ment were unsatisfactory. The first, voluntary cooperation, was obviously
ineffective, since violators could not be expected voluntarily to pave the
way for their own detection.' 2 The other method-use of the Federal
'76 Stat. 548 (1962).
2 Section 2(f).
3 Section 3(a). A demand for documents can only be made upon an entity "under
investigation." Ibid.; see H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1962).
4 Section 3(a) (inspection); § 4(c) (reproduction).
5 Section 3(b) (2).
0 Section 3(b) (1).
7 See § 4(d); 108 CoNG. Roc. 3666 (daily ed. March 13, 1962) (remarks of
Representative McCulloch).
8 Section 5 (a).
9 Section 5 (b).
10 See § 5(d).
11 See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as HousE REPoRT]; Hearings on S. 716 & S. 1003 Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings].
12 See remarks of Assistant Att'y Gen. Victor R. Hansen, in Senate Hearings
10-12.
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Trade Commission's investigatory powers for the benefit of the Attorney
General 'A-was never attempted,14 presumably because of the budgetary
problems involved in making the FTC the investigative arm of the Depart-
ment of Justice.15 Moreover, evidence obtained by the FTC apparently
could be used by the Attorney General only to prevent future violations
and not to prosecute past violations. 16 Consequently, it is doubtful that
use of FTC processes, even if administratively feasible, would enable the
Attorney General adequately to enforce the antitrust laws.
As a result of these inadequacies, the Department of Justice fre-
quently employed the criminal investigations of the grand jury as a dis-
covery instrumentality in civil antitrust suits.1 7  Clearly, evidence obtained
by the Department in a grand jury investigation can incidentally be used
for civil prosecutions,' 8 but resort to the grand jury when there is no
thought of criminal action perverts its function, 19 conflicts with the Depart-
ment of Justice's policy of instituting criminal suits only against the most
flagrant violators of the antitrust laws,20 and stigmatizes the companies
investigated.2 ' Consequently, in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,2
the Supreme Court indicated that if the Government used grand jury
proceedings solely to aid civil antitrust prosecutions, civil defendants would
be allowed discovery of the grand jury transcript.23  In concurring, Mr.
justice Whittaker maintained that in order to discourage such abuse of the
grand jury, transcripts should be impounded in all cases in which a "no true
bill" is voted so that neither party would have access to them except on
13 See 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §46(e) (1958).
14 107 CONG. REc. 20661 (1961) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
15 See HousE REPORT 4.
16 The statute gives the FTC power to investigate for the Attorney General
"in order that the corporation may thereafter . . . conduct . . . [its] business in
accordance with law." 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(e) (1958). (Emphasis
added.)
17 See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 56-57 (D.N.J.
1960) (discovery demand); Wadmond, The Defense of an Antitrust Proceeding:
Investigation, in ABA SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 435,
445 (1958). See generally Senate Hearings 2, 10; HouSE REPORT 3-4; Rockefeller
& Wald, Antitrust Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Depart-
ment of Justice: A Primer for Small Business, 66 Dicu. L. REv. 251, 254-56 (1962).
18 FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e) ; United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,
684 (1958) ; see United States v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 29379, E.D. Pa., Aug.
22, 1962.
19 See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 56-57 (D.NJ.
1960) ; United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 18, at 683-84 (dictum);
ATT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 343-48 (1955); Comment, 37 WASH. L.
REv. 278, 279-80 (1962). But see the contrary view of Louis B. Schwartz. ATT'y
GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 348-49 (1955).
20 See id. at 345.
21 The effect on a corporation may be more subtle than on an individual. Loss
of retail business may be negligible, but the effect of the stigma may be felt in other
ways, such as loss of credit in the financial community and a hesitancy of other
companies to deal with it for fear that they would be suspected of violation and
become targets for investigation.
22356 U.S. 677 (1958). The case arose on defendant's motion for discovery of
the grand jury transcripts upon which the Government based its civil case. The Court
held that good cause had not been shown to justify discovery of the documents in
light of the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
23 Id. at 683-84.
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order of a court for good cause.24 On a subsequent motion by the de-
fendant in this same case, the district court, after finding that the Depart-
ment of justice had misused the grand jury, allowed discovery of the
transcript 25 and indicated that if the Department continued this practice,
it would invoke a more coercive sanction-impounding the transcript and
suppressing all evidence obtained directly or indirectly by means of the
grand jury proceedings. 26 As a result, it is now clear that the use of the
grand jury for civil investigation is not only improper, but will no longer
be tolerated by the courts.
Another method of investigation employed by the Department of
Justice was to initiate civil antitrust actions supported by little or no
evidence in order to utilize the liberal discovery mechanisms of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 27 to acquire essential evidence.28  This method
of civil antitrust investigation placed on a defendant the costly and unfair
burden of preparing a defense29 when in fact the Government had little
reason to believe that the case would be litigated beyond the preliminary
stage 30 It also represented an improper use of the discovery procedures,
since discovery, like the grand jury investigation, was not intended to
make the courts an investigating arm of the Department of Justice.
3s
The Antitrust Civil Process Act attempts not only to provide the
Department of Justice with a legitimate and effective method of investi-
gating past antitrust violations, but also to enable the Department to
prevent corporate mergers that would result in an unlawful restraint of
trade.3 2  Previously, the Attorney General had no proper means, other
than use of the FTC processes, to compel merging companies to produce
documents relevant to possible antitrust violations. The usual modes of
inquiry, except in the rare case in which documents were produced vol-
untarily, were the illegitimate use of the grand jury or the employment of
discovery procedures after initiation of a bad faith civil suit.3 3 These
slow-moving processes prevented the Government from obtaining evidence
24Id. at 684 (concurring opinion).
25 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55 (D.NJ. 1960).
2 61d. at 63-64 (dictum). But see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180
F. Supp. 195, 201-06 (D.N.J. 1959).
2 7 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
2 8 AT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 344-45 (1955).
29 See generally Wadmond, op. cit. supra note 17, at 435; Chadwell, Pre-Trial,
in ABA SEcrIoN oF ANTITRUST LAw, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 455 (1958).
0 It has also been said that incomplete prior investigation results in the institu-
tion of unjustified suits, but that "public retreat" by the prosecutor may be impossible.
ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COMm. ANTITRUST REP. 344 (1955).
31 Procedures in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases Adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, reproduced in Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long
Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62, 67 (1951).
3 2 See 108 CoNG. REc. 3665 (daily ed. March 13, 1962) (remarks of Representative
Celler) ; HousE REPORT 5-6; Senate Hearings 11; Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11,
pt. 2 passim (1956).
33 See 108 CONG. REc., op. cit. supra note 32, at 3664; HousE REPoRT 3-4;
Senate Hearings 11.
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prior to the completion of a merger.3 4 The present statute seeks to remedy
this by providing the Attorney General with an expeditious civil demand
process that will enable him to act before the merger is an accomplished
fact.
II. POSSIBLE ABUSES
Although the statute is designed to facilitate civil prosecutions, the
evidence which it procures can be used in criminal cases; otherwise, crim-
inal acts uncovered by the investigation would be immunized from criminal
prosecution 3 5L-an obviously undesirable result. The act, however, limits
the scope of a demand to evidence that would be within the subpoena
power of a grand jury.a6 Consequently, the Government cannot obtain
evidence for criminal prosecutions by means of a civil process demand
that it could not acquire by means of a grand jury, and conversely the
defendant cannot be compelled to produce documents protected from dis-
covery by a grand jury. Nevertheless, the Government might attempt to
use the civil process demand to aid criminal prosecutions if it proves more
expeditious or less costly than the grand jury, although from the legis-
lative history of the present statute, it is clear that it would be an improper
application of the civil process demand to seek documents solely for use in
criminal prosecutions.3 7 To effectuate the clear intent of Congress, evi-
dence so obtained should be suppressed,38 with the burden on the de-
fendant to prove no Government intent to prosecute civilly. This will be a
difficult burden to carry, 3  however, and it is apparent that further prob-
lems will arise when the Government is contemplating both civil and crim-
inal prosecutions. The cases involving the use of the grand jury when the
Government has such dual motives indicate that so long as there is some
intention to bring a civil action, the courts will allow the Attorney General
to employ the civil demand process even though his primary interest is
criminal prosecution.
Additional grounds for concern can be found in sections 4(e) and
4(f), which authorize the reproduction and retention of copies of docu-
ments obtained by means of civil demand,4' and allow the Attorney General
34 See 108 CoNG. REc., op. cit. supra note 32, at 3665; Senate Hearings 11.
35 See 108 CONG. REc. 3666 (daily ed. March 13, 1962) (remarks of Representa-
tive McCulloch).31 See § 3 (c).
37 108 CONG. REC., op. cit. supra note 35, at 3666. Significantly, a last-minute
amendment to the bill deleted a provision allowing use of the civil demand for crimirfal
prosecutions under the Robinson-Patman Act. 54 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. A-1 (July 24, 1962) ; 60 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-3, A-4 (Sept. 4,
1962) ; HousE REPORT 2. While it is clear that Congress intended to restrict the
demand to civil prosecutions, its reasons for this limitation were not articulated and
are not apparent.
38 Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
39 Although it may be difficult for a defendant to prove the Government's motives
and intent at the time of the demand, it is not an impossible burden to meet. See
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960).
40 See authorities cited in and text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
41 See Statement of Richard K. Decker, Chairman, Comm. on Practice and Pro-
cedure, ABA Antitrust Section, in Senate Hearings 38.
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to accumulate a library of evidence against a potential defendant. The
danger is that evidence once gathered and retained, though not used in
any lawsuit, could be used as a club to force compliance with various man-
dates of the Justice Department,42 and perhaps other executive departments
as well.4 3 An example of this kind of action occurred in the recent steel
industry price dispute, when it was suggested that antitrust litigation was
one of several Government measures available to force the steel producers
to lower their prices in accordance with the President's wishes.44 Even
though a business might be able to resist these measures, it would have
to balance the cost of compliance against the cost of defending a vindictive
antitrust suit. Since a new demand can be made whenever there is
reason to suspect a violation of the antitrust laws, retention of copies of
documents produced pursuant to a demand appears to be a potent weapon 45
whose main justification is that the originals may be destroyed by the
company when they are returned at the close of an investigation. The
statute could adequately protect both the Government's and the company's
interest by providing for return of all copies on condition that the originals
be retained by the company for a specific period of time, subject to penalty
for failure to produce the documents upon a subsequent demand within the
statutory period.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The Attorney General is now authorized to demand documents when
he has "reason to believe" that a person under investigation has docu-
mentary material relevant to a civil antitrust investigation.4 The statu-
tory standard--"reason to believe"-could not mean the constitutional
standard applicable to natural persons-probable cause to believe; 47 such
a standard would be too strict to permit the probing contemplated by the
statute.48 Therefore, questions necessarily arise under the unreasonable
search and seizure and self-incrimination clauses of the Constitution.49
4 2 In its watchdog capacity of trying to prevent violations of the antitrust laws,
it is not uncommon for the Justice Department to warn corporations that future acts,
such as a contemplated merger, will result in the initiation of antitrust litigation by
the Government.
43 The statute forbids access to the evidence by any person outside the Justice
Department without the consent of the person who produced the evidence. §4(c).
However, it seems fair to assume that at least the President, if not other high-ranking
government officials, would have access to these materials.
44 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1961, § 4, p. 8, cols. 4-5.
45 See FTC v. Standard American, Inc., 306 F.2d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1962)
(dictum) ; cf. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan, 336 U.S. 793 (1949).
46 Section 3 (a).
47Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
48 If the standard were the constitutional standard of "probable cause," the scope
of the Justice Department's investigative power would be more restricted than the
FTC's investigative power and the Justice Department's criminal investigative sub-
poena power through the grand jury. However, the purpose of this statute is to
give the Attorney General civil investigative power equal to these powers. See HousE
REPORT 2.
49 Typically, one thinks of the constitutional search and seizure provision in
terms of criminal prosecution. Whether it is so limited is immaterial since the evi-
dence obtained by the civil demand may be used in a criminal proceeding. See text
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As applied to corporations, the statute is on fairly safe ground. A
corporation has no protection against self-incrimination, 0 and its protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures, in the context of docu-
ments demanded under legal process, is limited to prohibition of demands
or subpoenas that are so vague that the corporation cannot identify the
documents and records demanded.51  Thus, a corporation's rights in this
latter regard appear to be safeguarded by the present act's requirement
that a demand be made with definiteness and with reason to believe that
the corporation has relevant evidence.52 The constitutional question is not
so clear when the statute is applied to partnerships and unincorporated asso-
ciations. Exclusion of a corporation from protection against self-incrimina-
tion, and to some extent unreasonable search and seizure, is justified on the
basis that these rights are personal and therefore not available to a fictitious
person.53 This reasoning is not applicable to unincorporated associations.
However, in United States v. White,54 the Supreme Court restricted
the privilege against self-incrimination to those associations in which
the scope of activities and size of membership are such that the associa-
tion can be said to represent the personal interests of its members, and
not merely common group interests.55 The White test is also applicable
to unincorporated associations in fourth amendment cases,56 but the
situation is more confused in the case of partnerships. Some cases hold
that partnership books and records are always protected against searches
and seizures made without probable cause; 7 others apply the White
accompanying note 7 supra. In any event, there is authority holding constitutional
restraints on search and seizure applicable to civil suits. See United States v. Physic,
175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949) (forfeiture case) ; Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691
(1st Cir. 1938), 6 U. Cm. L. Rswv. 113; United States v. One 1960 Lincoln Two-Door
Hard-Top, 195 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1961) (forfeiture case); Schenck ex rel.
Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1938) (dictum). Contra,
Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F.2d 648 (D.N.J. 1930) ; see United States
v. One 1956 Ford 2-Door Sedan, 185 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Ky. 1960) (forfeiture case) ;
cf. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which indicated that even if the search
and seizure provisions apply to civil prosecutions, the Court is less likely to find
violations in non-criminal cases. On the facts of Frank, however, the civil-criminal
dichotomy is not controlling.
50 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1945) ; Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
51 See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 50; FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298, 306 (1924) ; Hale v. Henkel, supra note 50; Rockefeller & Wald, srupra note 17,
at 256; cf. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961); FTC v.
Standard American, Inc., 306 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1962).5 2 Sections 3(a), 3(b)(2).
3See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906).
54322 U.S. 694 (1944).
5 Id at 701.
56McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960), 75 HARv. L. Rzv. 40, 123;
Goldberg v. Truck Drivers Union, 293 F.2d 807 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
938 (1961).5 7 United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956) ; United
States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In the landmark search and
seizure case, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court did not discuss
the partnership aspect; if it was raised at all, the Court must have assumed that
partnership books were personal to the partners.
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test; 58 still others give no protection to partnerships.59 In any event, it is
apparent that there are many unincorporated associations and some, if not
all, partnerships against which the statute cannot be constitutionally ap-
plied.60 It might be said that unincorporated businesses are usually smaller
units and therefore less likely to run afoul of the antitrust laws. Size,
however, is not necessarily determinative of the probability of antitrust
violations.61
IV. CAVEAT
The civil process statute grants the Attorney General necessary civil
investigative powers. The statute, on its face, fairly protects corporations,
if not unincorporated businesses, upon whom a demand can be served.
However, in analogous situations, such as the issuance of search and arrest
warrants upon a showing of probable cause, 2 courts have vitiated the
causal standard through non-enforcement. It is possible that the "reason
to believe" standard of the present statute will receive similar treatment.
This standard is at best imprecise, but it should require more than a bare
averment by the Attorney General. In addition, the Government should be
held to its burden of showing some relevancy between the documents de-
manded and the alleged violation; otherwise, the civil demand process
could become a ready vehicle for fishing expeditions into the files and
records of corporations 6 incurring the disfavor of the Attorney General.
s United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963), affirming 210 F.
Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C.
1954) (criminal prosecution) ; In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D.
Cal. 1948).
59 United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1961) ; United States
v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (civil action).
60 Congress appears to have anticipated these constitutional problems, for it pro-
vided in § 3(c) that no demand shall require the production of documents which would
be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a grand jury subpoena or shall contain
any demand which would be "unreasonable" if contained in a grand jury subpoena.
Apparently, this section would protect privileged communications. Cf. Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Tobacco & Allied Stocks v. Transamerica
Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del. 1954). It would also exempt documents "unreasonably"
demanded because not relevant to the investigation. Cf. Moore Business Forms, Inc.
v. FTC, 307 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
61 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948) ; Rocke-
feller & Wald, Antitrust Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice: A Primer for Small Business, 66 DicK. L. Rav. 251 (1962).
62 See, e.g., Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Ques-
tioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges it General,
51 J. CRmr. L., C. & P.S. 386, 388 (1960).
3The extent to which noncorporate businesses would be protected depends upon
their constitutional protection under the self-incrimination and search and seizure
clauses. See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
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